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The paper proposes an alternative methodology for testing signalling hypothesis based 
on chances to get a job in a particular class of the job market. The individuals are 
ranked and matched by an external mechanism, based on preferences of employers in 
respect to actual observable and perceived unobservable attributes of individual. This 
paper tests existence of a relation between the set of observable and revealed attributes 
and the outcome of the game, specifically: whether signals associated with attained 
education plays a significant role in determining chances of the individual to get a job. 
The proposed model is empirically tested by applying a unique dataset from a natural 
experiment, conducted in Poland in years 2002-2005, where a relatively large set of 
job market candidates are offered a chance to get a paid internship at an attractive 
employer, with considerably great chances of getting a permanent job thereafter. 
Results support the hypothesis, that in the absence of revealed attributes, employers 
decisions depend upon signals on education. Whenever information is available, the 
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According to the concept of signalling hypothesis, introduced by Spence (Spence 
1974), firms have incentives to pay higher wages for attained education, while 
individuals have incentives to acquire extra education, even in the absence of 
increased productivity caused by this extra schooling. As summarized by Singell and 
others (e.g. Singell, Seaman, Chatterji 1998) motivation of individuals to go to school 
is thus not limited to learning skills, but it is also driven by higher expected benefits 
from schooling, higher discount rate of future payoffs and enjoying learning (e.g. 
Hartog, 1983; Altonji, 1995). The assumed correlation of those incentives with 
attributes of productive worker provides an objective signal of their capabilities, that 
enhance return to on-the-job training, reduce the probability that individual will quit 
the job or reduce costs of monitoring.   
The hypothesis requires asymmetric distribution of information between 
individual and employer regarding actual level of individual’s skills. Assuming a 
positive correlation between performance in school and the productivity at the 
workplace, employers use the information on the attained education to observe the 
underlying potentials of the individuals, that are not observed directly.  
  Most of the empirical tests of signalling hypotheses are based on the 
relationship between wages and education in earnings equations (e.g. Willis, 1986; 
Murphy and Welch, 1990). The relationship between higher education and increased  
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wages is explained either directly by increasing individual productivity as effect of 
additional schooling or indirectly through a positive correlation of the attributes of the 
productive worker with education.  
The paper proposes another method of testing signalling hypothesis, alternative 
to explaining the differences in earnings. The signalling potential of education is 
measured by chances of an individual to get a job in a particular model of the job 
market, introduced in details in the following chapter. Briefly introducing: there exist 
sets of open slots (job positions) and individuals as well as an external mechanism, 
that matches individuals with available slots, one after another. The individual with 
the highest rank is designated to have a job, though the final decision of admitting or 
rejecting an individual is left to a firm, that makes its after revising individuals 
observed attributes. The matching mechanism operates as long as there are any 
available slots left., that observing set of signals makes its decision out of individuals 
that . Once all the available slots are matched, the game is over: all matched 
individuals have a job, while all unmatched become unemployed.  
By providing an alternative method of testing signalling hypothesis, author 
overcomes drawback of existing literature, where the available data significantly 
limits opportunity to measure the effect of signalling. Additionally, by determining 
chances of getting a job, instead of explaining differences in wages, the presented 
analysis makes it more plausible to filter out the signalling effect and direct 
productivity-enhancing return to education, which in most studies on education are  
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confounded (e.g. Weiss, 1995).  
  This paper develops a theoretical model that extracts a signal from the 
probability of being offered a job opportunity as a function of observed educational 
attainments and set of abilities revealed by an individual. The empirical analysis uses 
unique dataset from a natural experiment, conducted in Poland in years 2002-2005, 
where a relatively large set of job market candidates are offered a chance to get a paid 
internship at an attractive employer, with considerably great chances of getting a 
permanent job thereafter.  
  The empirical analysis is based on the operational database of the founder and 
manager of the program – PricewaterhouseCoopers in Poland.
1 The available dataset 
was unique in its detail of personal attributes and provided extensive information on 
how the matching process was realized. An ordered-logit analysis uses discrete levels 
of the highest attained stage of competition for each given individual to measure 
his/her chances to get a job. The differences between attained levels are used to derive 
a continuous signal measure that is found to depend on individual attributes, including 
signals from attaining higher education. The estimated coefficients on attained 
universities may be used to construct a time varying ranking of higher education 
institutions in Poland in terms of their ability to increase chances of their graduates on 
the job market, whereas the statistical significance was used to test signalling 
hypothesis.  
                                                 
1 The empirical part of the paper was made possible by PricewaterhouseCoopers in Poland, Department of 





The approach proposed in this paper offers an alternative method of testing signalling 
hypothesis by measuring chances of an individual to get a job under fixed and 
uniformly distributed slots of available positions, conditional upon observable 
attributes.  
The number of available slots k is limited and considerably lower than number 
of individuals n, so n > k. There exists an external mechanism, that based on a 
preference relation rule ranks individuals in respect to some observed ability and 
matches the most preferable individuals, one after another, with available slots. The 
matching process is repeated as long as there are available slots. Once all the available 
slots are matched, the competition is over: all matched individuals have a job, while 
all unmatched become unemployed.  
The mechanism consists of two stages, which works as follows. In each 
iteration, in the first stage, the weakly preferred individual to all individuals that are in 
the pool is drawn and offered a chance to get a job, out of a relatively small subset of 
available slots. If individual does not accept any of the designated slots, he/she comes 
back to a pool. If he accepts it, he/she is pre-selected to face the second stage of 
selection process. 
In the second stage of the process, symmetrically, firm is allowed to select one  
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individual of the designated subset of individuals who were pre-selected in the first 
stage and who have accepted the job position. If individual is successful in the second 
stage, he/she gets a job, other way – individual comes back to a pool.  
In the additional stage of selection process, where firm selects one of the set of 
pre-selected individuals, attributes of individuals are not entirely observed directly by 
the firm. Firms use the unobservable attributes to support their decision. Employers 
may exploit, detailed information on the attained education and ability attributes of 
individuals.  
The wage is assumed to be the same across the slots, so neither individual nor a 
firm compete using monetary payoffs. Thus, even if an individual may go through the 
matching mechanism many times, he/she has no incentive to do so: instead he/she is 
induced to act as quickly as possible to accept an offered match in order to find the 
best available matching. Similarly, firm also wants to fill the available slots as soon as 
possible, to avoid a risk of losing the best available individuals, whereas the individual 
to avoid a risk to becoming an unemployed individual.  
  Formally, each individual i is described by a set containing vectors of 
observable attributes ψi and unobservable attributes φi.  
  For simplicity, it is assumed that there does not exist any threshold level of 
observable attributes, that firms setup. This assumption allows to treat the first stage 
of the matching process as a random process, i.e. there exists no mechanism of 
constructing the subset of slots, that are offered to the most preferred individual in the  
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first stage. If all individuals were restricted to be indifferent between any two slots, the 
first stage of matching process would be a random event, conditional upon 
individual’s rank. But, since individuals are allowed to reveal their preferences in 
respect to slots, the first stage plays an important role in allowing to get the preferred 
outcome of the entire game. 
 
Let Ω stands for the set of individuals: 
 
Ω = {Ιi: 0 < i < n+1, Ιi = { i ;  , ψi , φi} }        [ 1 ]  
 
while Α for the set of available slots: 
 
A = {Γj: 0 < j < k+1, Γj = { j ; ~ : j ; ~ ∼  j Φ  (ψi ,  i φ ˆ ),  i φ ˆ (ψi)}}    [2] 
 
After each successful matching iteration, the number of available slots k and 
available individuals n shrinks by one. Since the initial number of available slots is far 
lower than this of individuals, the Bayesian probability of getting the job after any 
successful matching is lower (Pi,t > Pi,t+1 ∀i,t,). This provides, as described earlier, the 
incentive for an individual rather to accept one of the offered slots, than to reject all of  
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them and wait for the next iteration.
2  
As shown, the i-individual preferences are exogenous, but preferences of the j-
firm depends on the observable attributes of i-individual as well as on the expected 
non-observable attributes that are based on the observable. If one allows j-firm 
preferences  j ; ~ to be represented by an indirect utility function  j Φ  of a regular 
properties, it may be shown, that under fixed and constant wage across firms and 
individuals and positive relationship between observed abilities and actual 
productivity, the firm’s utility maximization problem is a symmetric to a profit 
maximization problem under unrestricted wages. Additionally, under general 
assumptions – e.g. constant marginal returns to abilities, the firm’s decision should be 
the same in respect to a given individual.  
Since the indirect utility function  j Φ   depends on the observable attributes only 
j Φ  (ψi ,  i φ ˆ (ψi)), firm’s decision may be represented by setting a set of thresholds in 
observed attributes, that decide whether to accept or reject an individual. The indirect 
utility is a linear function of observable attributes, whereas the probability that a firm 
will hire individual depends upon the thresholds – set of critical values δs for each of s 
stages of the competition.  
  If vector of observable attributes of i-individual includes information on the 
                                                 
2 Individuals do not know their actual rank unless it is the highest, nor the number of remaining available slots k. 
The rank is revealed to individual only if it is the highest, when the individual is offered a subset of available 
slots in the first stage. The ranking rule is allowed to slightly change in each iteration, so individual who rejects 
all offered slots in the first stage may not be ranked as the highest in the following iteration.   
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education attained by i-individual πi:  
 
  ψi = {Θi, πi}          [3a] 
hence: 
j Φ ˆ i (ψi ,  i φ ˆ (ψi)) = AΘi, + Bπi + ε       [3b] 
 
where  Θi stands for all the remaining observable information on i-individual 
attributes, testing the significance of the vector B of coefficients on πi provides an 
evidence for accepting or rejecting the signalling hypothesis. 
In order to conduct the test, the unknown values of the thresholds will be 
estimated using maximum likelihood for each threshold δs: 
 
P(δs <  j Φ  < δs+1) = P(δs -  AΘi, - Bπi  < ε  < δs+1 -  AΘi, - Bπi  ) 
 
III. Natural Experiment 
 
“Grasz o staż” (eng. „Play for internship”) is the most recognized opportunity for 
polish students and graduates to get an internship. It was started in 1996 and 
conducted since then by PricewaterhouseCoopers and the “Gazeta Wyborcza” daily. 
Depending on the year, a total of up to 200 internships were made available in each  
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edition, mostly at regional quarters of global corporations, leading domestic 
companies, governmental and non-governmental organizations and the state 
administration.  
In order to provide equal opportunities to students from different regions of the 
country, all internships are paid, with a salary sufficient to support temporary 
accommodation and cover costs of living out of home or study town.   
The Competition targets on university students of the third, fourth, or fifth year 
and graduates; for many of them it opens a gateway to their first job experience 
related to their education. An opportunity to win an internship placement, with 
potentially high probability of turning it into a regular employment strongly encourage 
students and graduates to participate. The average chances to get internship were in 
the range of 10 – 20 percent. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics, including 
information on how the structure of participants across stages of the competition in 
each edition was distributed. 
3 
A wide information set on profiles of preferences and attitudes against the labor 
market comes from a full-sample survey conducted at the entry level. Based on the 
questions asked, for many of the competitors,  the participation in the program was a 
first step in their professional career. Beside winning an internship, winners are 
provided with a job market training and an opportunity to attend mobility training 
sessions to facilitate their future job search process. The inclusion of institutions of 
                                                 
3 For 2002 edition, only dichotomous classification of the stages was available. Analysis does not cover data on 
2003 edition.  
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public administration and non-governmental organizations, play a role in diversifying 




The data source for the empirical analysis was provided by PricewaterhouseCoopers 
in Poland, founder and organizer of the “Grasz o staz” program. The actual data used 
in analysis was extracted from the operational SQL based dataset. These data are 
unique in their detail of the individual, enhancing the ability to perform an empirical 
analysis. The data were collected during the 2002, 2004 and 2005 editions of the 
competition, including in total 4245 observations.  
The operational character of the source additionally gave an opportunity to 
build a dataset, that allows to track the individual progress of the matching process, 
which may be used in further research to describe dynamically, how the game on the 
experiment’s job market is being played.  
Most of the variables used for further testing have been applied in their raw 
form. Though, there also exists a lot of variables that were generated based on the 
information provided. Particularly, the logit specification required standardization and 
aggregation of many of the available information. All the operations performed on the 
original dataset will be described in details.  
Since the datasets were provided separately for each edition of the program,  
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their merge involved generating dummy variables for each year of the edition. 
Similarly, information on all dichotomous attributes were turned into dummies, e.g. 
gender into female status, graduation from education system into absolvent status etc.
4 
All geographical information were quantified as much as possible to avoid over-
aggregation: place was coded using unique ZIP code, region was described by set of 
dummies, etc.  
There was a particular attention brought to quantifying data on education. 
Participants of the program were students of or have graduated from more than 300 
different higher education institutions, including more than 100 foreign based. The 
high dispersion of the schools made it necessary to focus on the most common and  to 
treat all remaining as a homogenous group. Similar problem concerned faculties and 
departments. In order to bring as much information into logit specification as possible, 
the less popular occurrences were aggregated into wider categories, wherever possible 
without biasing outcome. Thus every educational attainment of all participants was 
described by a triple of dummies standing for school, faculty/department and major. 
Many contestants have graduated (or were still studying) on more than one institution 
and thus additional variable has been specified: number of institutions attended. To 
take into account effect of newly graduating students, which are particularly motivated 
to win an internship, as well as are firms mostly interested in hiring them, two 
additional variables were created: number of months to/since graduation (for all 
                                                 
4 Though all the geographical information were transformed to quantitative form, the variables describing 
location were not included in the current analysis.  
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participants) and number of months remaining to graduation (for students only). 
Whereas the latest included only positive numbers for those who have already 
graduated, the first one included both negative numbers (for current students) and 
positive for graduated. 
 
The attributes of technical skills were described in original dataset by discrete 
choices. Respondents were asked to evaluate their knowledge of six of the most 
popular foreign languages (English, German, French, Italians, Russian and Spanish) 
with possibility to list up to two additional languages, whereas all of them were 
separately evaluated in a scale: 0 – no skills, 1 – basic knowledge, 2 – intermediate 
level,  3 – advanced communication. Additionally to using this information, additional 
variables were generated: number of foreign languages known on at least basic level 
and similar variable for a number of foreign languages, known at least on an 
intermediate level. Beside the described above, extra variables were created to allow 
for joint knowledge of the pairs of languages, e.g. English and German, etc. In the 
latest case, the level of knowledge of one language has been multiplied by a level of 
knowledge of another. This allowed to distinguish for a substitution effect in learning 
languages, where usually respondents were focusing on an advanced communication 
in one language with opportunity cost of  limited knowledge of another.  
Similarly to evaluation of foreign languages, participants evaluated their 
knowledge of different aspects of computer skills. They were asked to assess their  
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practical knowledge of 62 programs and operating systems either as basic, 
intermediate, advanced or none at all. In case of operating systems, the choices were: 
user, basic administration or advanced administration. Since in case of computer 
skills, one intuitively expects spill-over effects of knowledge, neither a cross-
evaluation of joint knowledge of pairs of listed programs, nor a number of total 
programs known was calculated. 
Finally, the crucial part for testing signalling hypothesis was included – the 
evaluation of previous professional experience. Contestants were allowed to list up to 
10 different professional experiences, for each of them, providing date of beginning, 
date of quitting, name of the employer and description of the position. Those 
information were very detailed and if only appropriately quantified, were expected to 
provide important results. In spite of the natural difficulty and arising problems with 
application of such data into the quantitative analysis, the series were used after being 
transformed into a quantitative specification. This part of the original data processing 
was the most challenging and left the most doubts about its appropriateness and 
consistence. The only objective measure was the length of experience, calculated in 
months, based on span of time between starting the  job and quitting it, whereas for 
current experience, the month when the official results of the program are revealed (in 
each edition it was June) was taken as the upper boundary of the time span. The other 
information available: name of the employer and position was quantified by 
associating a discrete number: form 1 to 4, depending on its significance in terms of  
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recruiting process. The highest notes for employer’s name were placed for global 
companies operating in Poland, regarded as the most attractive and demanding 
employers (such firms as: Arthur Andersen, CapGemini, Deloitte&Touche 
Ernst&Young, KPMG, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Procter&Gamble, Unilever, etc.). 
The next highest levels were associated with the most attractive domestic employers 
and second-rank global companies (Bank Handlowy S.A., BIG Bank Millenium, 
Citibank, Phillip Morris, Telekomunikacja Polska S.A., etc.). The other level was 
associated with other publicly recognized firms, where former experience and its 
evaluation can be easily checked with high confidence of their accurateness, whereas 
the lowest level was associated with all the remaining firms, that are not large enough 
to provide a transparent information, confirming the professional experience. 
Additionally, in case of any work provided abroad, the evaluation was upgraded by 
one to reward for cultural experience and other attributes of working abroad. The 
quality of the job was evaluated similarly to quantification of the quality of the 
employer, but here by assessing a perceived level of responsibility of the position. The 
responsibility was very widely understood, either by amount of people supervised, the 
material responsibility, impact on the environment or publicity. The highest 
evaluations were granted to e.g. upper-level managers, including CEO’s, moderator of 
the live-broadcasted regional TV show or a first-role starring in a popular sitcom. 
Respectively, the lowest grades were obtained for a regular positions that does not 
require any level of responsibility, like picking up fruits, working as a waiter/ess, etc.  
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As noted earlier, this part of analysis raises the most concerns and thus its 




To test the hypothesis within the proposed analytical framework an ordered logit 
model was estimated.  
The level of competition that was attained by each participant provides 
dichotomous description of a natural order that may estimate an unobservable, 
continuous measure of the preferences of the employers. If this could be viewed as a 
one dimensional linear combination of the observable attributes, weighted by 
importance of each independent attribute on the employer’s preferences, then a 
coefficient on the signal associated with educational institution attended by individual 
provides information on how brand of each university is important in terms of chances 
to get a job. 
Any differences between estimated values provides an insightful information 
on how institutions differ among each other in signalling the unobserved abilities of 
individuals, regardless of any other observable attributes. The empirical results were 
provided for a large number of different model specifications, that allowed for testing 
different compositions of vectors of observable information on individuals Θi 
excluding signals on education.   
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The data were aggregated into groups containing different aspects of attributes. 
The detailed description of the groups is presented in Table 2. There were four groups 
of variables created: language skills, computer skills, professional experience and 
academic profile. The last of those contained information on major, department, 
number of universities, level of advancement in studies, etc. Joint combinations of all 
the groups allowed for thirteen different ways of specifying the model within each 
subsample, including an empty specification that did not contained any information 
(the only observable attribute is education signal). After testing those specifications 
for each subset of contestants, a total of  about 1300 different specifications were 
estimated.  
The subsets of contestants were chosen based on the results of the most 
aggregated data, data exhibited a relatively high dispersion in respect to such 
fundamental variables like: gender, graduation status (absolvent) and year of edition. 
In order to get rid of possible fixed effects associated with aggregation, each subset of 
the listed three variables were separately tested.  
The inclusion of extensive dataset, that consists of very detailed, often – not 
popular attributes – negatively affected estimations, specifically for the more narrowly 
defined subsets of contestants. Most of logit estimations achieved in the widest 
specification of the model did not achieved convergence. This made necessitated to 
drop most of those “unpopular” attributes from specification and repeat estimations 
again.   
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The procedure of estimating parameters and checking the convergence was 
conducted multiple times. Each iteration leaded to a reconsideration of the most 
troublesome variables and eventually omitting it in further way. The presented results 
are those obtained for the most narrowly defined specification, so their provided an 
insightful analysis of responsiveness of education signals to differences in model 
specification.  
Since a total of 63 universities was individually tested for statistical 
significance of their signals, only results for a sub-sample of those were presented in 
Table 2. The results for the most recognized universities were chosen here as well as 
those results that were consistently significant.  
The results provided an empirical evidence for signalling hypothesis in the 
proposed framework of the job market. Particularly significance of the outcome of the 
signal does not change regarding different specification of the model, though a 
relatively weak robustness of the obtained specification indicates coexistence of 
additional issues, that may play important role. Particularly, the omitted variable 
problem should be concerned. Even though the dataset included very detailed 
information on the attributes of individuals, relatively small number of available job 
positions made an extensive use of many of the variables not possible in the 
application of an ordered-logit procedure.  
The results obtained for more narrowly defined sub-samples of contestants in 
most occurrences increased the statistical significance of the obtained results, proving  
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the existence of differentiated clusters of attributes within narrowly defined groups. 
Particularly, male students were less supposed to ace their quality of the language 
skills – instead the quantitative aspect – number of languages known played a more 
important role than in case of women.  
The differences between students and graduates confirmed theoretical and 
intuitive predictions as exhibited an increasing role of experience factors in 
determining their chances to get a job, with a relatively less important role of their 
education. 
The general result of the analysis is that as one could expect based on intuition 
– the less information on attributes is provided for analysis, the more variance in 
explanatory variable is being explained by available signals on education. However, 
the expansion of the number of the variables included in the analysis, as well as 
providing partial estimates for sub-samples provides a contradictive conclusion, that 
signals on education attained lacks its significance. The most narrowly defined sub-
samples did not exhibit any ability to converge, thus even unabling to provide any 
estimates of the significance. 
This conclusion supports basic assumption of the signalling hypothesis, that 
information asymmetry has to be present in order for employers to make an use of 
signals in estimating the perceived abilities. Whenever, the information is revealed, 
employer does not need signals on education to make recruitment decision. 
  
21
VI. Final remarks 
 
The paper tested the signalling hypothesis in the higher education in Poland, based on 
a natural experiment of a competition for students and graduates to win a lucrative 
internship at one of the most desired employers.  Using data on participants’ 
performance through a multi-stage selection process of the competition, their skills, 
educational background and professional experience, it has been tested, whether 
according to the signalling hypothesis, the brand of the school attended has significant 
impact on the chances to win the internship. The application of the ordered logit 
model in empirical part was caused by the way in which the job market has been 
modelled: the polychotomous outcomes of the multistage competition provided a 
natural estimation, that allowed to construct representation of the firm’s utility.  
The differences across the results were used to construct rankings of 
universities, in terms of their signalling possibilities. The theoretical model derived 
here, as an alternative method for testing signalling hypothesis, explained the 
contestants’ abilities in terms of chances to get a job. The estimates support the 
predictions of the model that signalling depends on firm size and monitoring 
requirements and provide a continuous, predicted signal measure for second-stage 
earnings equations. The earnings results provide the first formal evidence of a 
significant positive return to a signal that differs by gender and indicate a downward 
bias in the return to education from excluding the signal measure.  
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  Some of the basic concerns in testing empirical models have to be 
addressed. The first of them that appears to be of a particular significance for 
extending the obtained results for a more general conclusions is a problem of self 
selection. 
It seems plausible to test for existence of sample pre-selection of contestants in 
this particular application. The program “Grasz o staz” is provided by a profit oriented 
organization, and thus it is intutitive to expect, that any decisions concerning its 
strategy is focused on optimised effects. If this is a reasonable assumption, one would 
expect an asymmetrical interest in participating in respect to university to exist: 
particularly, students of the more known institutions are more likely to be targeted by 
promotion of the program and thus more  likely to attend it. Any promotional actions, 
provided by organizers at large or targeted schools may increase performance of 
students recruiting from those places. Similarly, peer effects are likely to arise, since 
communication with other participation may lead to synergy effects and help those 
students to have better chances to win an internship.  
Though, one could propose an alternative scenario: because of asymmetric 
promotion of the program in respect to schools, students of the non-targeted 
institutions may be more likely – relatively to overall performance of their cohort - to 
win an internship as their participance in the contest – not enhanced by external 
factors is a purely endogenous self-motivation.  
The effect of those or any other scenario should definitely be considered in the  
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further work, for example by including in testing specification variables with available 
data on the sources of information regarding the contest and factors that brought 
individuals attention and supported decision of participating.  
Another issue is that have been – at least partially included in the analysis are 
fixed effects. As noted earlier, different estimations were provided for sub-samples 
segregated based on gender, graduation status and year of edition. This, however only 
partially solves the problem, since also other variables than those three listed above 
may exhibit fixed effects, and more detailed specification could be alternatively 
proposed. Beside that, the relation between variables may not be consistent over time. 
Especially, in terms of exogenous shocks, with a flag example of the European 
Integration that opened huge opportunity to many young people to work abroad, may 
structurally change the mechanism of employers’ preferations.  
Another important source of fixed effect may come from changing 
specification of the abilities: introduction of new technologies – especially software 
skills, but one could mention languages instead, changes the definition of the expected 
“average” level of skills. It may lead to an overestimation of such skills in earlier 
editions and lead to an underestimation of the latter. This problem may also arise 
within the year edition – across the individuals. It seems reasonable to assume, that 
people from small towns or less competitive institutions will differently assess their 
skills in respect to their peers from large institutions. Thus an objective measurement 
of their skills or correction of potential bias, based on results of appropriate studies  
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into the analysis would support judgement of presented notions. 
Relate to the fixed effect is the problem with upper limit on the skills. One 
could argue, that for example advanced communication in English may be very 
widely distributed across individuals, but its accurateness can be easily checked 
during an interview with a differentiation leading to a selecting the right person. This 
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Table 1a. Descriptive statistics for main variables in the sample 
 
  Total  4245  Female  2114  Male  2131
Variable    Mean Std.  Dev.   Mean Std.  Dev.   Mean Std.  Dev.
            
absolwent    0,324 0,468    0,334 0,472    0,313 0,464 
female    0,498 0,500    1,000 0,000    0,000 0,000 
language skills                     
lang_english 2,460  0,662    2,464 0,665    2,455 0,659 
lang_french 0,384  0,761    0,505 0,855    0,264 0,632 
lang_german 0,982  0,940    1,007 0,981    0,957 0,896 
lang_italian 0,089  0,373    0,131 0,456    0,048 0,260 
lang_max   2,552 0,594    2,581 0,572    2,524 0,615 
lang_oth   0,158  0,510    0,187 0,558    0,130 0,457 
lang_russian  0,459 0,747    0,456 0,764    0,462 0,730 
lang_spanish 0,117  0,417    0,154 0,484    0,080 0,334 
laureat_status 0,995  1,437   0,866  1,375  1,124  1,486 
nr_lang_avg 1,490  0,683    1,587 0,696    1,393 0,656 
nr_lang_basic 2,458  0,858   2,569  0,871  2,348  0,832 
professional experience                     
months of #1 experience  7,451  15,584   7,284  15,142   7,618  16,013 
employer of #1 experience  0,804  0,686  0,794  0,668  0,814  0,704 
position of #1 experience  0,701  0,556  0,693  0,550  0,709  0,563 
max employer of experience  1,342 0,837    1,343 0,821    1,341 0,853 
max lenght of experience  24,0  381,9    30,7  531,9    17,3  99,0 
max position of experience  0,982  0,529    0,977  0,509    0,986  0,548 
education                    
AE Kraków  0,018  0,133    0,021 0,143    0,015 0,124 
AE Poznań    0,033 0,180    0,038 0,192    0,029 0,167 
AE Wrocław  0,025 0,157    0,024 0,153    0,027 0,161 
AGH Kraków  0,015  0,122    0,012 0,108    0,018 0,134 
Polit. Białostocka  0,016 0,127    0,009 0,097    0,023 0,151 
Politechnika Gdańska  0,004 0,065    0,004 0,065    0,004 0,065 
Polit. Krakowska  0,012  0,109  0,010  0,102  0,014  0,116 
Polit. Rzeszowska  0,011  0,105  0,010  0,099  0,012  0,110 
Politechnika Śląska  0,023 0,149    0,007 0,081    0,038 0,192 
Polit. Świętokrzyska  0,013 0,114    0,006 0,075    0,021 0,142 
PWSBiA Warszawa  0,006  0,078  0,009  0,094  0,003  0,057 
Szkoła Główna Handlowa  0,024  0,155   0,029  0,169  0,020  0,139 
SWPS Warszawa  0,030  0,170    0,035 0,185    0,024 0,153 
UAM Poznań  0,032 0,177    0,038 0,191    0,027 0,161 
Uniwersytet Jagieloński 0,003  0,057    0,004 0,065    0,002 0,048 
Uniwersytet Szczeciński  0,004 0,063    0,005 0,072    0,003 0,053 
Uniwersytet Warszawski  0,008  0,092  0,006  0,078  0,011  0,103 
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Table 1b. Descriptive statistics for main variables in the sample 
 
   2004  1590  2005 1789  Graduate 1374    Student  2871
Variable   Mean 
Std. 
Dev.    Mean Std.  Dev.  Mean  Std.  Dev.    Mean Std.  Dev. 
                       
absolwent   0,277  0,448   0,302  0,459 1,000  0,000    0,000  0,000 
female   0,513  0,500   0,513  0,500  0,515  0,500    0,490  0,500 
language skills                     
lang_english 2,405  0,698   2,458  0,642 2,355  0,715    2,510  0,629 
lang_french 0,387  0,765   0,385  0,763 0,400  0,770    0,376  0,757 
lang_german 0,961  0,946   0,924  0,907 0,865  0,904    1,038  0,951 
lang_italian 0,079  0,347   0,108  0,415 0,094  0,384    0,087  0,368 
lang_max  2,507  0,628   2,547  0,578 2,463  0,638    2,595  0,567 
lang_oth   0,134  0,472   0,151  0,503 0,177  0,557    0,149  0,486 
lang_russian 0,437  0,732   0,439  0,730  0,563  0,780    0,409  0,725 
lang_spanish 0,137  0,456   0,155  0,469 0,102  0,400    0,124  0,425 
laureat_status 0,768  1,368   1,348  1,520 0,932  1,392    1,025  1,458 
nr_lang_avg 1,445  0,684   1,475  0,690 1,448  0,715    1,509  0,667 
nr_lang_basic 2,414  0,865   2,470  0,866 2,482  0,935    2,446  0,819 
professional experience                     
months of #1 experience  7,222  15,77   7,736 15,568  10,981 19,178    5,762  13,204
employer of #1 experience  0,724  0,648   0,806 0,652  0,962 0,656   0,728  0,688 
position of #1 experience  0,648  0,567   0,717 0,557  0,828 0,503   0,639  0,570 
max employer   1,246  0,787   1,330  0,765 1,469  0,831    1,281  0,833 
max lenght of experience  15,8  74,0  37,3 583,8  23,0  97,0    24,5  459,5 
max position of 
experience  0,956 0,556   1,006  0,525  1,063 0,497   0,943  0,540 
education                    
AE Kraków  0,023  0,149   0,023  0,150 0,023  0,151    0,016  0,124 
AE 
Poznań   0,036  0,186   0,048  0,213  0,028 0,164   0,036  0,187 
AE Wrocław 0,034  0,181   0,030  0,171  0,029 0,168   0,024  0,152 
AGH Kraków  0,018  0,134   0,020  0,139 0,008  0,089    0,018  0,135 
Polit. Białostocka 0,018  0,134   0,023  0,150 0,015  0,123    0,017  0,130 
Politechnika Gdańska 0,006  0,075   0,005  0,071  0,003  0,054    0,005  0,070 
Polit. Krakowska  0,015  0,122   0,015 0,122  0,009 0,093   0,014  0,116 
Polit. Rzeszowska  0,016  0,127   0,012 0,108  0,009 0,097   0,012  0,108 
Politechnika Śląska 0,028  0,166   0,029  0,166  0,009 0,093   0,029  0,169 
Polit. Świętokrzyska 0,019  0,138   0,014  0,117 0,012  0,111    0,014  0,116 
PWSBiA Warszawa  0,010  0,100   0,006 0,075  0,006 0,076   0,006  0,079 
Szkoła Główna Handlowa  0,030  0,171   0,031  0,174 0,020  0,139    0,027  0,162 
SWPS Warszawa  0,033  0,178   0,041  0,199 0,040  0,196    0,025  0,155 
UAM Poznań 0,043  0,202   0,039  0,193  0,035 0,184   0,031  0,173 
Uniwersytet Jagieloński 0,006  0,075   0,003 0,053  0,002 0,047   0,004  0,062 
Uniwersytet Szczeciński 0,004  0,061  0,006 0,078  0,002 0,047   0,005  0,070 
Uniwersytet Warszawski  0,008  0,090   0,013 0,113  0,009 0,093   0,008  0,091  
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Table 2a. Coefficients of an Ordered-Logit Model for Testing Signaling Hypothesis 
 
Total results                      
specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
         
Log-Likelihood  -2910,3 -2853,4 -2983,5 -4522,1 -3020,5 -4657,0 -4696,6 
pseudo-R
2  ,087 ,091 ,054 ,070 ,042 ,061 ,040 
observations  2845 2808 2818 4175 2818 4245 4192 
                      
1,338** 1,453**  1,251*  0,617*  1,407** 0,722**  0,473 
AE Kraków  (0,675) (0,699) (0,643) (0,330) (0,628) (0,320) (0,313) 
1,537*** 2,026*** 1,533*** 1,048*** 1,822*** 0,871*** 0,793*** 
AE Poznań  (0,575) (0,592) (0,540) (0,278) (0,524) (0,269) (0,261) 
1,295**  1,489***  1,172**  0,852*** 1,388*** 0,836*** 0,654*** 
AE Wrocław  (0,579) (0,597) (0,546) (0,291) (0,530) (0,283) (0,275) 
1,661*** 1,862*** 2,005*** 0,972*** 2,062*** 0,900*** 1,166*** 
AGH Kraków  (0,570) (0,587) (0,530) (0,331) (0,517) (0,323) (0,313) 
1,499*** 1,663*** 2,019*** 1,131*** 2,184*** 1,104*** 1,652*** 
Polit. Białostocka  (0,497) (0,520) (0,461) (0,331) (0,455) (0,320) (0,297) 
1,167* 1,304*  1,672***  0,077  1,661***  0,011  0,671 
Politechnika Gdańska  (0,686) (0,699) (0,621) (0,597) (0,616) (0,584) (0,524) 
0,814*  1,278***  1,157*** 0,812** 1,343*** 0,684** 0,977*** 
Polit. Krakowska  (0,465) (0,480) (0,446) (0,353) (0,437) (0,347) (0,330) 
0,769 1,118**  1,127**  0,657*  1,306***  0,716**  0,926*** 
Polit. Rzeszowska  (0,532) (0,561) (0,505) (0,376) (0,502) (0,360) (0,348) 
0,500  0,887*  1,498*** 0,716** 1,652*** 0,614** 1,353*** 
Politechnika Śląska  (0,451) (0,482) (0,423) (0,315) (0,418) (0,306) (0,282) 
1,163*** 1,349*** 1,495*** 1,053*** 1,682*** 1,046*** 1,332*** 
Polit. Świętokrzyska  (0,498) (0,527) (0,475) (0,346) (0,467) (0,334) (0,321) 
1,304*  1,649*** 1,361** 1,269*** 1,363**  0,983** 1,171*** 
PWSBiA Warszawa  (0,666) (0,692) (0,643) (0,477) (0,638) (0,461) (0,462) 
0,791  1,186**  0,562 0,579* 0,754 0,575* 0,304 
Szkoła Główna Handlowa  (0,529) (0,564) (0,509) (0,306) (0,500) (0,297) (0,289) 
0,587 1,228** 0,637  1,009***  0,953*  0,918***  0,716*** 
SWPS Warszawa  (0,559) (0,604) (0,535) (0,290) (0,526) (0,276) (0,269) 
0,189 0,713 0,123  0,564**  0,421  0,479*  0,340 
UAM Poznań  (0,594) (0,631) (0,563) (0,287) (0,552) (0,280) (0,272) 
-0,321 0,082 -0,229 -0,116 -0,078 -0,190 -0,171 
Uniwersytet Jagieloński  (0,979) (1,010) (0,968) (0,711) (0,954) (0,703) (0,696) 
1,160  1,431*  0,858 1,071** 0,930 1,043** 0,782 
Uniwersytet Szczeciński  (0,798) (0,825) (0,757) (0,501) (0,742) (0,497) (0,483) 
-0,210 0,347 -0,252 -0,022 0,166 -0,130 -0,104 
Uniwersytet Warszawski  (0,829) (0,878) (0,790) (0,433) (0,777) (0,425) (0,413) 
                      
language  skills  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
professional  experience   Yes Yes Yes Yes    Yes 
computer  skills  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
education  specified  Yes Yes Yes    Yes     
                       
* (**, ***) – statistically significant at 5% (2,5%, 1%) level; standard errors in brackets  
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Table 2b. Coefficients of an Ordered-Logit Model for Testing Signaling Hypothesis 
 
Total results (cont.)                   
specification  (8)  (9)  (10) (11) (12) (13) 
        
Log-Likelihood  -2938,2 -3044,9 -4581,5 -3090,2 -4799,3 -4742,4 
pseudo-R
2  ,078 ,045 ,064 ,031 ,032 ,031 
observations  2845 2845 4192 2845 4245 4192 
                   
1,441** 1,175*  0,780***  1,312** 0,529*  0,596* 
AE Kraków  (0,664) (0,613) (0,326) (0,593) (0,304) (0,309) 
1,785*** 1,279*** 1,241*** 1,579*** 0,633*** 1,058*** 
AE Poznań  (0,564) (0,515) (0,272) (0,497) (0,254) (0,257) 
1,446***  1,136**  0,961*** 1,382*** 0,658*** 0,847*** 
AE Wrocław  (0,569) (0,522) (0,285) (0,504) (0,269) (0,271) 
1,723*** 1,831*** 1,072*** 1,875*** 1,018*** 1,252*** 
AGH Kraków  (0,561) (0,511) (0,328) (0,496) (0,308) (0,309) 
1,572*** 1,925*** 1,208*** 2,123*** 1,591*** 1,792*** 
Polit. Białostocka  (0,491) (0,446) (0,324) (0,439) (0,290) (0,295) 
1,270*  1,586*** 0,219 1,552*** 0,518  0,713 
Politechnika Gdańska  (0,681) (0,605) (0,593) (0,603) (0,512) (0,518) 
0,998**  0,883**  0,948*** 1,078*** 0,847*** 1,143*** 
Polit. Krakowska  (0,459) (0,429) (0,348) (0,419) (0,324) (0,323) 
0,923*  0,916*  0,797**  1,131*** 0,872*** 1,007*** 
Polit. Rzeszowska  (0,528) (0,479) (0,367) (0,474) (0,339) (0,345) 
0,626  1,271*** 0,802*** 1,431*** 1,184*** 1,500*** 
Politechnika Śląska  (0,449) (0,400) (0,311) (0,394) (0,275) (0,279) 
1,254*** 1,433*** 1,196*** 1,614*** 1,260*** 1,497*** 
Polit. Świętokrzyska  (0,491) (0,450) (0,342) (0,442) (0,310) (0,317) 
1,352** 1,111*  1,253***  1,137* 0,900**  1,157*** 
PWSBiA Warszawa  (0,660) (0,626) (0,474) (0,617) (0,450) (0,459) 
0,966* 0,429  0,695**  0,606  0,278  0,423  Szkoła Główna 
Handlowa  (0,526) (0,482) (0,302) (0,471) (0,282) (0,286) 
0,892  0,368 1,118*** 0,717 0,671***  0,916*** 
SWPS Warszawa  (0,555) (0,504) (0,283) (0,493) (0,261) (0,266) 
0,515 -0,012  0,672***  0,330 0,275 0,497* 
UAM Poznań  (0,587) (0,533) (0,284) (0,518) (0,266) (0,268) 
-0,214 -0,566 -0,006 -0,406 -0,316 -0,101 
Uniwersytet Jagieloński  (0,970) (0,941) (0,703) (0,927) (0,687) (0,688) 
1,289 0,698  1,069**  0,831 0,733 0,776 
Uniwersytet Szczeciński  (0,784) (0,730) (0,494) (0,705) (0,480) (0,478) 
0,125 -0,408 0,171 0,068 -0,230 0,200 
Uniwersytet Warszawski  (0,823) (0,753) (0,429) (0,735) (0,409) (0,410) 
                   
language  skills   Yes    Yes  
professional experience      Yes      Yes 
computer  skills  Yes  Yes      
education  specified  Yes  Yes  Yes    
                    
* (**, ***) – statistically significant at 5% (2,5%, 1%) level; standard errors in brackets   
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Table 2c. Coefficients of an Ordered-Logit Model for Testing Signaling Hypothesis 
 
Women                  
specification  (5)  (7)  (11) (12) (13) 
       
Log-Likelihood  -1298,6 -2114,6 -1358,5 -2197,1 -2163,2 
pseudo-R
2  ,068 ,064 ,040 ,044 ,042 
observations  1356 2081 1376 2114 2081 
                
2,340** 0,670 2,173**  0,797* 0,860* 
AE Kraków  (1,153) (0,478) (0,988) (0,453) (0,467) 
3,088***  0,971***  2,522*** 0,815** 1,336*** 
AE Poznań  (0,979) (0,413) (0,839) (0,395) (0,402) 
2,073** 0,832* 1,805** 0,827*  1,034*** 
AE Wrocław  (1,005) (0,443) (0,871) (0,426) (0,433) 
3,312*** 1,167** 2,750***  0,969*  1,287*** 
AGH Kraków  (1,004) (0,538) (0,892) (0,520) (0,529) 
2,277*** 1,473*** 2,082*** 1,290*** 1,761*** 
Polit. Białostocka  (0,804) (0,533) (0,719) (0,507) (0,523) 
2,090** 0,710  1,595*  0,397  0,803 
Politechnika Gdańska  (0,983) (0,805) (0,931) (0,772) (0,773) 
1,803*** 1,115**  1,484**  0,903*  1,439*** 
Polit. Krakowska  (0,779) (0,526) (0,702) (0,507) (0,513) 
0,298 0,784 0,608 0,891 0,741 
Polit. Rzeszowska  (1,050) (0,577) (0,891) (0,546) (0,571) 
-0,133 0,058 -0,134 -0,203 0,461 
Politechnika Śląska  (1,314) (0,767) (1,230) (0,744) (0,745) 
0,833 0,223 0,667 0,176 0,475 
Polit. Świętokrzyska  (1,112) (0,770) (1,025) (0,757) (0,753) 
1,381 1,670*** 1,220 1,497***  1,491*** 
PWSBiA Warszawa  (1,040) (0,594) (0,922) (0,574) (0,587) 
0,900 0,401 0,953 0,468 0,516 
Szkoła Główna Handlowa  (0,979) (0,447) (0,833) (0,427) (0,440) 
1,415 1,066*** 1,325 1,002***  1,338*** 
SWPS Warszawa  (1,010) (0,422) (0,853) (0,400) (0,412) 
0,738 0,584 0,813 0,506  0,768* 
UAM Poznań  (1,086) (0,423) (0,908) (0,407) (0,414) 
0,190 0,744 -0,148 0,462 0,652 
Uniwersytet Jagieloński  (1,559) (0,913) (1,419) (0,890) (0,899) 
0,988 1,161* 1,247 1,087*  1,357** 
Uniwersytet Szczeciński  (1,342) (0,642) (1,142) (0,634) (0,647) 
0,732 0,355 0,522 -0,079 0,953 
Uniwersytet Warszawski  (1,510) (0,719) (1,295) (0,689) (0,702) 
                 
language  skills   Yes  Yes  
professional experience  Yes  Yes      Yes 
computer  skills       
education specified  Yes    Yes     
                 





Table 2d. Coefficients of an Ordered-Logit Model for Testing Signaling Hypothesis 
 
Male                       
specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
         
Log-Likelihood  -1573,465 -1659,044 -2407,517 -1686,392 -2550,091 -2510,230 -1573,465 
pseudo-R
2  - - - - - - - 
observations  1469 1455 1458 2101 1458 2131 2105 
                      
0,459 0,491 0,567 0,645 0,703 0,712 0,403 
AE Kraków  (0,939) (0,929) (0,820) (0,468) (0,802) (0,458) (0,436) 
0,801 1,058 0,652  1,197***  0,995  1,055***  0,726** 
AE Poznań  (0,826) (0,803) (0,706) (0,389) (0,682) (0,376) (0,356) 
0,890  0,864  0,520 0,907** 0,883  0,943***  0,512 
AE Wrocław  (0,811) (0,787) (0,702) (0,393) (0,677) (0,381) (0,364) 
0,709 0,781 0,843  0,860**  1,135*  0,906**  0,928*** 
AGH Kraków  (0,772) (0,758) (0,663) (0,431) (0,646) (0,417) (0,394) 
1,955*** 1,778*** 2,145*** 1,077*** 2,377*** 1,124*** 1,566*** 
Polit. Białostocka  (0,696) (0,701) (0,618) (0,420) (0,612) (0,406) (0,371) 
1,247 1,869**  1,737** 0,339 1,858** 0,286  0,987 
Politechnika Gdańska  (0,922) (0,925) (0,834) (0,848) (0,834) (0,820) (0,724) 
0,879 0,719 0,628  1,347*  0,918  1,562**  1,513** 
Polit. Krakowska  (1,296) (1,285) (1,047) (0,776) (1,039) (0,767) (0,718) 
1,049 1,325*  1,474***  0,647  1,684***  0,697  1,096*** 
Polit. Rzeszowska  (0,701) (0,701) (0,617) (0,510) (0,606) (0,486) (0,453) 
0,660  1,033*  1,352*** 0,829** 1,557*** 0,783** 1,294*** 
Politechnika Śląska  (0,553) (0,569) (0,487) (0,376) (0,477) (0,365) (0,333) 
1,547*** 1,544*** 1,536*** 1,252*** 1,697*** 1,256*** 1,328*** 
Polit. Świętokrzyska  (0,614) (0,628) (0,549) (0,417) (0,536) (0,401) (0,377) 
2,829*** 3,113*** 2,533***  1,568*  2,433**  0,994  1,208 
PWSBiA Warszawa  (1,176) (1,161) (1,092) (0,906) (1,082) (0,861) (0,887) 
1,194  1,703***  0,608 0,674 0,864 0,671 0,266 
Szkoła Główna Handlowa  (0,731) (0,719) (0,636) (0,431) (0,615) (0,420) (0,403) 
2,221**  2,158**  1,143 0,947 1,083 1,032 0,409 
SWPS Warszawa  (1,037) (1,007) (0,907) (0,664) (0,881) (0,656) (0,633) 
0,540 0,823 0,012 0,539 0,198 0,546 0,181 
UAM Poznań  (0,875) (0,865) (0,738) (0,408) (0,721) (0,397) (0,376) 
0,035  0,496 -0,632 -1,145 -0,327 -1,003 -1,234 
Uniwersytet Jagieloński  (1,395) (1,389) (1,325) (1,160) (1,314) (1,149) (1,141) 
1,966 1,693 0,979 0,829 0,695 0,823 0,231 
Uniwersytet Szczeciński  (1,218) (1,139) (1,083) (0,798) (1,017) (0,795) (0,790) 
                     
language skills  Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
professional  experience   Yes Yes Yes Yes    Yes 
computer  skills  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
education specified  Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes     
                       





Table 2e. Coefficients of an Ordered-Logit Model for Testing Signaling Hypothesis 
 
 Male (cont.)                   
specification (8)  (9)  (10) (11) (12) (13) 
        
Log-Likelihood  -1573,465 -1659,044 -2407,517 -1686,392 -2550,091 -2510,230 
pseudo-R
2  - - - - - - 
observations  1469 1455 1458 2101 1458 2131 
                   
0,464  0,488 - 0,590  0,425  0,424 
AE Kraków  (0,912) (0,801)  -  (0,778) (0,428) (0,429) 
1,019  0,430 1,312*** 0,817  0,570 0,899*** 
AE Poznań  (0,796) (0,691) (0,378) (0,664) (0,346) (0,348) 
1,054  0,586 1,012*** 0,982  0,539  0,718** 
AE Wrocław  (0,780) (0,684) (0,384) (0,657) (0,355) (0,356) 
0,890 0,838  1,077***  1,107*  0,923***  1,099*** 
AGH Kraków  (0,747) (0,648) (0,421) (0,628) (0,386) (0,388) 
1,967*** 2,175*** 1,196*** 2,442*** 1,555*** 1,730*** 
Polit. Białostocka  (0,682) (0,600) (0,411) (0,593) (0,361) (0,369) 
1,485 1,457* 0,640 1,578* 0,840  1,000 
Politechnika Gdańska  (0,906) (0,800) (0,848) (0,806) (0,707) (0,723) 
0,965  0,858 1,410* 1,160  1,767***  1,564** 
Polit. Krakowska  (1,288) (1,034) (0,761) (1,030) (0,697) (0,701) 
1,216* 1,169** 0,835*  1,430***  0,924**  1,212*** 
Polit. Rzeszowska  (0,683) (0,595) (0,483) (0,584) (0,441) (0,446) 
0,810  1,054**  0,982*** 1,252*** 1,103*** 1,469*** 
Politechnika Śląska  (0,539) (0,465) (0,370) (0,455) (0,324) (0,329) 
1,554*** 1,498*** 1,417*** 1,640*** 1,268*** 1,489*** 
Polit. Świętokrzyska  (0,594) (0,524) (0,410) (0,512) (0,363) (0,372) 
2,631** 2,091*  1,511*  2,043*  0,577  1,191 
PWSBiA Warszawa  (1,149) (1,074) (0,888) (1,063) (0,835) (0,855) 
1,463** 0,342 0,842** 0,606  0,221  0,413 
Szkoła Główna Handlowa (0,703) (0,617) (0,422) (0,598) (0,394) (0,396) 
2,144**  1,204 1,114* 1,120  0,435  0,498 
SWPS Warszawa  (0,997) (0,889) (0,649) (0,867) (0,628) (0,623) 
0,761 -0,096  0,700*  0,125 0,169 0,344 
UAM Poznań  (0,846) (0,720) (0,402) (0,701) (0,368) (0,371) 
0,250 -0,648 -0,878 -0,358 -1,087 -0,986 
Uniwersytet Jagieloński  (1,370) (1,303) (1,155) (1,291) (1,128) (1,135) 
1,662 0,931 0,728 0,674 0,254 0,100 
Uniwersytet Szczeciński  (1,132) (1,091) (0,778) (1,005) (0,789) (0,764) 
                 
language  skills   Yes    Yes  
professional  experience     Yes    Yes 
computer  skills  Yes  Yes      
education specified  Yes  Yes    Yes     
                    




Table 2f. Coefficients of an Ordered-Logit Model for Testing Signaling Hypothesis 
 
 Student 2005                   
specification  (5) (7) (9)  (10)  (11) (13) 
         
Log-Likelihood  -1330,5 -1670,3 -1375,2 -1723,0 -1688,9  -1744,4 
pseudo-R
2 ,052  ,056  ,040  ,046  ,046  ,034 
observations  985  1223 1006 1248 1223  1248 
                   
2,145*** 0,858* 1,868***  1,060**  1,237*** 1,185*** 
AE Kraków  (0,777) (0,469) (0,742) (0,494) (0,506)  (0,485) 
2,235*** 0,983*** 1,770*** 0,916*** 1,493***  1,201*** 
AE Poznań  (0,647) (0,350) (0,617) (0,393) (0,403)  (0,381) 
1,813*** 0,828** 1,619*** 0,935** 1,292***  1,191*** 
AE Wrocław  (0,682) (0,416) (0,649) (0,452) (0,460)  (0,441) 
1,984*** 0,964** 1,595*** 0,979** 1,322***  1,109*** 
AGH Kraków  (0,673) (0,436) (0,639) (0,471) (0,479)  (0,464) 
3,090*** 2,534*** 2,913*** 2,634*** 2,910***  2,770*** 
Polit. Białostocka  (0,632) (0,453) (0,607) (0,485) (0,499)  (0,480) 
2,744*** 2,131*** 2,650*** 2,190*** 2,553***  2,383*** 
Politechnika Gdańska  (0,765) (0,685) (0,741) (0,695) (0,716)  (0,689) 
2,065*** 1,651*** 1,663*** 1,555*** 1,985***  1,668*** 
Polit. Krakowska  (0,568) (0,487) (0,560) (0,513) (0,517)  (0,497) 
2,078*** 1,486*** 1,854*** 1,528*** 1,911***  1,737*** 
Polit. Rzeszowska  (0,650) (0,547) (0,659) (0,558) (0,583)  (0,551) 
2,217*** 1,938*** 1,917*** 1,843*** 2,276***  1,950*** 
Politechnika Śląska  (0,474) (0,384) (0,532) (0,420) (0,434)  (0,413) 
1,811*** 1,254*** 1,987*** 1,599*** 1,813***  1,951*** 
Polit. Świętokrzyska  (0,601) (0,535) (0,645) (0,558) (0,571)  (0,549) 
2,616*** 2,820*** 2,357*** 2,832*** 3,051***  2,847*** 
PWSBiA Warszawa  (0,847) (0,802) (0,908) (0,827) (0,812)  (0,797) 
1,264*** 0,658  1,044*  0,692 1,072*** 0,872** 
Szkoła Główna Handlowa  (0,475) (0,407) (0,621) (0,441) (0,453)  (0,434) 
1,336***  1,376*** 1,077* 1,297***  1,660*** 1,397*** 
SWPS Warszawa  (0,501) (0,421) (0,649) (0,444) (0,462)  (0,431) 
1,104*** 0,691*  1,014  0,703  1,094***  0,902** 
UAM Poznań  (0,472) (0,404) (0,679) (0,443) (0,448)  (0,430) 
2,520* 2,117*  2,202  1,967*  2,507***  2,165** 
Uniwersytet Jagieloński  (1,340) (1,090) (1,454) (1,108) (1,056)  (1,050) 
1,015 0,968 0,949 0,994  1,415**  1,250** 
Uniwersytet Szczeciński  (0,651) (0,603) (0,860) (0,628) (0,633)  (0,615) 
0,460 0,266 0,497 0,281 0,792  0,581 
Uniwersytet Warszawski  (0,643) (0,535) (0,899) (0,566) (0,567)  (0,551) 
                     
language  skills   Yes  Yes      
professional  experience  Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes 
computer skills        Yes     
education  specified  Yes  Yes  Yes   
                    
* (**, ***) – statistically significant at 5% (2,5%, 1%) level; standard errors in brackets  
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Table 2g. Coefficients of an Ordered-Logit Model for Testing Signaling Hypothesis 
 
 Graduate 2004               Graduate 2005 
specification (7)  (10)  (11)  (13)  (11)  (13) 
          
Log-Likelihood -310,5  -329,5  -336,0  -351,9  -708,1  -721,2 
pseudo-R
2  ,150 ,121 ,080 ,061  ,038  ,034 
observations  430 440 430 440  534  541 
                   
0,387 0,222 0,164 0,296  0,395  0,819 
AE Kraków  (0,830) (0,827) (0,779) (0,767)  (0,665)  (0,640) 
0,296 -0,116 0,530 0,406  0,205  0,338 
AE Poznań  (0,838) (0,838) (0,783) (0,770)  (0,606)  (0,598) 
-0,208 -0,522 -0,178 -0,258  0,973* 1,156** 
AE Wrocław  (0,918) (0,905) (0,862) (0,849)  (0,566)  (0,557) 
-21,105 -21,309 -21,279 -21,328  1,067  1,204 
AGH Kraków  (36850,090) (34451,870) (38758,930) (35170,780)  (0,835)  (0,835) 
0,493 0,354 0,720 0,792  1,133*  1,163* 
Polit. Białostocka  (0,888) (0,888) (0,853) (0,840)  (0,621)  (0,605) 
-19,647 -20,056 -21,376 -21,328  -21,618 -21,741 
Politechnika Gdańska  (55568,160) (55378,290) (55579,780) (55609,880) 
(66267,750
) (46857,980) 
-21,390 -21,726 -21,446 -21,328  1,385*  1,478* 
Polit. Krakowska  (32119,210) (33754,560) (34816,200) (35170,780)  (0,800)  (0,772) 
1,519 0,806 0,963 0,696  1,408*  1,495* 
Polit. Rzeszowska  (1,107) (1,077) (1,055) (1,030)  (0,775)  (0,765) 
-0,532 -0,675 -0,421 -0,373  1,418* 1,547** 
Politechnika Śląska  (1,271) (1,265) (1,243) (1,226)  (0,780)  (0,778) 
2,303*** 1,982**  2,093** 2,062**  0,838  0,843 
Polit. Świętokrzyska  (0,994) (0,977) (0,965) (0,932)  (0,702)  (0,656) 
0,130 0,110 0,061 0,024  2,346*  2,618* 
PWSBiA Warszawa  (1,354) (1,323) (1,325) (1,266)  (1,380)  (1,371) 
-1,203 -0,637 -1,370 -0,593 -0,064  0,138 
Szkoła Główna Handlowa  (1,224) (0,990) (1,192) (0,947)  (0,668)  (0,657) 
0,260 0,276 0,009 0,348  0,553  0,733 
SWPS Warszawa  (0,860) (0,816) (0,824) (0,771)  (0,524)  (0,510) 
0,166 -0,030 0,039 0,026  0,850  0,908 
UAM Poznań  (0,820) (0,806) (0,770) (0,757)  (0,556)  (0,551) 
-20,591 -20,776 -21,476 -21,328  -21,795 -21,741 
Uniwersytet Jagieloński  (52391,800) (53426,110) (55692,840) (55609,880) 
(66267,750
) (66267,190) 
-21,106 -21,377 -21,023 -21,328  -0,319  -0,032 
Uniwersytet Szczeciński  (78762,150) (78644,250) (78762,150) (78644,250)  (1,312)  (1,303) 
0,842 0,479 0,829 0,696  -1,345 -1,127 
Uniwersytet Warszawski  (1,095) (1,080) (1,047) (1,030)  (1,174)  (1,164) 
                   
language skills  Yes           
professional experience  Yes  Yes    Yes    Yes 
computer skills    Yes         
education specified      Yes    Yes   
                    
* (**, ***) – statistically significant at 5% (2,5%, 1%) level; standard errors in brackets  
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Table 2h. Coefficients of an Ordered-Logit Model for Testing Signaling Hypothesis 
 
Female student           
specification (10)  (12)  (13) 
     
Log-Likelihood -1434,2 -1484,3 -721,2 
pseudo-R
2 ,050  ,030  ,034 
observations 1387  1407  541 
           
1,058* 1,200**  0,819 
AE Kraków  (0,571) (0,539) (0,640) 
1,658*** 1,464***  0,338 
AE Poznań  (0,428) (0,408) (0,598) 
1,132** 1,035** 1,156** 
AE Wrocław  (0,505) (0,485) (0,557) 
1,377*** 1,150**  1,204 
AGH Kraków  (0,592) (0,577) (0,835) 
1,902*** 1,745***  1,163* 
Polit. Białostocka  (0,558) (0,542) (0,605) 
1,082 1,132  -21,741 
Politechnika Gdańska  (0,809) (0,791)  (46857,980) 
1,798*** 1,513***  1,478* 
Polit. Krakowska  (0,551) (0,532) (0,772) 
0,589 0,794  1,495* 
Polit. Rzeszowska  (0,683) (0,627) (0,765) 
0,668 0,566  1,547** 
Politechnika Śląska  (0,773) (0,748) (0,778) 
0,472 0,427 0,843 
Polit. Świętokrzyska  (0,888) (0,872) (0,656) 
1,606*** 1,506***  2,618* 
PWSBiA Warszawa  (0,649) (0,642) (1,371) 
0,937** 0,910**  0,138 
Szkoła Główna Handlowa  (0,472) (0,454) (0,657) 
1,547*** 1,402***  0,733 
SWPS Warszawa  (0,464) (0,436) (0,510) 
0,826* 0,777*  0,908 
UAM Poznań  (0,451) (0,434) (0,551) 
1,301 0,933  -21,741 
Uniwersytet Jagieloński  (0,940) (0,926)  (66267,190) 
1,745*** 1,648***  -0,032 
Uniwersytet Szczeciński  (0,705) (0,682) (1,303) 
1,030 0,628 -1,127 
Uniwersytet Warszawski  (0,769) (0,753) (1,164) 
           
language skills    Yes   
professional  experience  Yes  Yes 
computer skills  Yes     
education  specified     
           
* (**, ***) – statistically significant at 5% (2,5%, 1%) level; standard errors in brackets  
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Table 2i. Coefficients of an Ordered-Logit Model for Testing Signaling Hypothesis 
 
Male student                    
specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        
Log-Likelihood  -1332,3 -1329,1 -1402,2 -1627,8 -1425,4 -1665,6 
pseudo-R
2  ,124 ,117 ,068 ,108 ,053 ,099 
observations  1230 1220 1220 1448 1220 1464 
                   
0,413 0,501 0,520 0,433 0,627 0,327 
AE Kraków  (0,841) (0,847) (0,752) (0,566) (0,735) (0,556) 
0,920 1,254* 0,544  1,266***  0,893  1,082*** 
AE Poznań  (0,713) (0,705) (0,639) (0,419) (0,616) (0,410) 
0,990 1,107 0,336  0,834*  0,761  0,930** 
AE Wrocław  (0,713) (0,701) (0,641) (0,437) (0,617) (0,427) 
0,600 0,872 0,736 0,709  1,114*  0,677 
AGH Kraków  (0,678) (0,681) (0,606) (0,454) (0,592) (0,444) 
1,638*** 1,445** 2,153***  1,284***  2,455***  1,408*** 
Polit. Białostocka  (0,705) (0,708) (0,616) (0,511) (0,606) (0,494) 
0,883 1,241  1,528*  0,290  1,649**  0,178 
Politechnika Gdańska  (0,902) (0,903) (0,812) (0,867) (0,809) (0,846) 
0,702 0,810 0,662 0,373 0,818 0,344 
Polit. Krakowska  (0,620) (0,611) (0,557) (0,559) (0,535) (0,549) 
0,714 0,915  1,141**  0,307  1,339***  0,328 
Polit. Rzeszowska  (0,651) (0,642) (0,577) (0,559) (0,563) (0,552) 
0,329  0,636 1,189*** 0,518 1,373*** 0,525 
Politechnika Śląska  (0,462) (0,467) (0,410) (0,403) (0,400) (0,393) 
1,197** 1,209**  1,479*** 0,917* 1,602***  1,011** 
Polit. Świętokrzyska  (0,523) (0,525) (0,475) (0,481) (0,462) (0,466) 
2,034* 1,923* 1,950*  1,418  1,651  0,606 
PWSBiA Warszawa  (1,220) (1,160) (1,138) (1,097) (1,122) (1,016) 
0,846  1,266***  0,474 0,581 0,684 0,471 
Szkoła Główna Handlowa  (0,542) (0,524) (0,510) (0,474) (0,489) (0,466) 
0,292 0,555 0,330 0,437 0,503 0,521 
SWPS Warszawa  (0,644) (0,633) (0,568) (0,511) (0,553) (0,493) 
0,255 0,406 -0,074 0,093 0,041 0,132 
UAM Poznań  (0,638) (0,635) (0,574) (0,513) (0,565) (0,497) 
-0,493 -0,390 -0,516 -1,257 -0,263 -1,103 
Uniwersytet Jagieloński  (1,258) (1,278) (1,239) (1,195) (1,233) (1,185) 
1,626 1,146 0,877 0,772 0,532 0,922 
Uniwersytet Szczeciński  (1,022) (0,920) (0,956) (0,839) (0,877) (0,842) 
0,194  0,474 -0,255 -0,160 -0,006 -0,114 
Uniwersytet Warszawski  (0,799) (0,801) (0,746) (0,645) (0,739) (0,636) 
                    
language  skills  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
professional  experience   Yes Yes Yes Yes   
computer skills  Yes  Yes    Yes    Yes 
education specified  Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes   
                    
* (**, ***) – statistically significant at 5% (2,5%, 1%) level; standard errors in brackets  
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Table 2j. Coefficients of an Ordered-Logit Model for Testing Signaling Hypothesis 
 
Male student (cont.)                    
specification  (8)  (9)  (10) (11) (12) (13) 
        
Log-Likelihood  -1631,1 -1453,1 -1761,8 -1743,4 -1682,7 -1782,8 
pseudo-R
2  ,103 ,044 ,047 ,044 ,090 ,035 
observations  1444 1230 1464 1448 1464 1464 
                   
0,226 0,381 0,346 0,356 0,188 0,230 
AE Kraków  (0,552) (0,718) (0,501) (0,495) (0,539) (0,490) 
1,354*** 0,678  0,667*  0,972***  1,145***  0,789** 
AE Poznań  (0,412) (0,599) (0,378) (0,375) (0,396) (0,363) 
0,958** 0,818  0,602  0,713*  1,062***  0,801** 
AE Wrocław  (0,431) (0,597) (0,394) (0,393) (0,416) (0,384) 
0,821*  0,956* 0,973***  1,245*** 0,820* 1,126*** 
AGH Kraków  (0,452) (0,576) (0,404) (0,401) (0,437) (0,394) 
1,412*** 2,483*** 2,071*** 2,195*** 1,441*** 2,185*** 
Polit. Białostocka  (0,510) (0,592) (0,429) (0,444) (0,486) (0,427) 
0,553  1,426*  0,908 1,151 0,392 0,983 
Politechnika Gdańska  (0,880) (0,791) (0,729) (0,742) (0,850) (0,733) 
0,531 0,694 0,725  0,858*  0,402  0,786* 
Polit. Krakowska  (0,553) (0,523) (0,472) (0,467) (0,538) (0,459) 
0,513 1,187** 0,683  0,917*  0,508  0,841* 
Polit. Rzeszowska  (0,558) (0,548) (0,492) (0,495) (0,542) (0,485) 
0,789* 1,148***  1,070***  1,351*** 0,653* 1,179*** 
Politechnika Śląska  (0,405) (0,384) (0,340) (0,342) (0,385) (0,332) 
1,012**  1,568*** 1,256*** 1,338*** 1,063*** 1,325*** 
Polit. Świętokrzyska  (0,475) (0,444) (0,412) (0,414) (0,455) (0,402) 
1,209 1,319 0,260 0,870 0,589 0,299 
PWSBiA Warszawa  (1,045) (1,097) (0,974) (1,013) (0,963) (0,930) 
0,794*  0,506 0,147 0,454 0,685 0,326 
Szkoła Główna Handlowa (0,462) (0,478) (0,437) (0,431) (0,455) (0,423) 
0,774 0,436 0,515 0,572 0,689 0,629 
SWPS Warszawa  (0,508) (0,542) (0,447) (0,448) (0,477) (0,433) 
0,266 0,056 -0,152 0,040 0,316 0,001 
UAM Poznań  (0,503) (0,553) (0,451) (0,453) (0,490) (0,445) 
-1,143 -0,350 -0,952 -0,795 -0,943 -0,757 
Uniwersytet Jagieloński  (1,188) (1,216) (1,152) (1,159) (1,172) (1,147) 
0,689 0,634 0,471 0,147 0,769 0,279 
Uniwersytet Szczeciński  (0,816) (0,871) (0,831) (0,783) (0,805) (0,780) 
-0,015 0,092 -0,380 -0,198 0,102 -0,162 
Uniwersytet Warszawski  (0,643) (0,721) (0,602) (0,599) (0,627) (0,590) 
                    
language  skills   Yes    Yes  
professional  experience     Yes    Yes 
computer  skills  Yes  Yes      
education  specified  Yes  Yes  Yes    
                    
* (**, ***) – statistically significant at 5% (2,5%, 1%) level; standard errors in brackets 
 
 